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An oft-cited and robust result from Public Goods Game experiments is that, when subjects start playing, 
the aggregate level of contributions is significantly different from zero. At the same time, a sizeable 
proportion of players free ride from the outset. Behavioural economics has persuasively shown that 
these laboratory findings are compatible with the presence of motivationally heterogeneous agents, 
displaying  both  standard,  self-centred  preferences  and  non-standard,  interdependent  preferences. 
However, at the theoretical level, economists would prefer to account for motivational heterogeneity 
endogenously, instead of simply assuming it from the outset. Our work provides such endogenisation, 
by  assuming  that  social  evolution  is  driven  by  material  payoffs  only.  By  separately  focusing  on 
different  types  of  ‘experimentally  salient’  pro-social  players  (such  as  Reciprocators,  Strong 
Reciprocators and Altruists), we are able to shed light – to our knowledge, for the first time, within the 
public good framework – on the evolutionary stability of two-type populations consisting of positive 
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 1 Introduction
Collective action dilemmas among humans remain central today within a large
number of relevant domains where either positive or negative externalities are
produced, from the use of shared resources to automobile traﬃc control. As
we know from the economic literature speciﬁcally dealing with such issues for
more than two decades, the problem of voluntary provision of public goods has
not a straightforward way-out, as, at individual level, the well-known temp-
tation to ride free on the generosity of others would arise and jeopardise the
provision of the good itself1. However, despite the threat of socially ineﬃcient
equilibria emergence due to extensive free riding on the part of independent,
‘rational’ individuals, successful real-life attempts to privately provide various
types of public goods abound in several societies, including projects such as
street cleaning and lighting, child care, contributions to local security and play-
ground maintenance. In other words, several collective action dilemmas turn out
to be successfully addressed, even though the presence of free riders cannot be
ruled out. Similar conclusions have been reached, in the last decades, through
experimental research on private provision of public goods, mainly conducted
within the well-known Public Goods Game (PGG) or Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism (VCM) framework2. Such highly controlled experiments involve
small groups of individuals who are endowed with a given sum of money and
allowed to either invest (possibly part of) it in a public account (‘cooperate’)
or keep it in a private account (‘defect’). As Masclet et al. (2003) observe, this
game is appealing as “it starkly isolates the conﬂict between self-interest and
group interest and allows a simple measure of the extent of group-interested
behavior” (p. 366). A key message from experimental research in this area
is that economic theory overestimates the prevalence of free riding in PGGs:
laboratory evidence indicates that in the aggregate individuals contribute sig-
niﬁcantly more than would be implied by pure self-interest alone (Rabin, 1993).
This is particularly true in one-shot, nonrepeated game protocols (as well as in
the early stages of repeated PGGs), where, in contrast with predictions based
on a strong version of the free riding hypothesis, subjects tend to make nonzero
contributions, of 40-60% of the Pareto eﬃcient level (Dawes and Thaler, 1988;
see also Anderson and Putterman, 2006). However, in paying attention to the
aggregate level of positive contributions to the public account, we should care-
fully consider the fact that, in the same settings, a sizeable proportion of players
does conform to the Homo Oeconomicus model, by riding free on the generos-
ity of others (see e.g. Gintis, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001 and Kocher et al.,
2008). In other words, the whole picture reveals that a signiﬁcant degree of be-
havioural heterogeneity exists, within the group of players involved in the PGG:
while some of them are ‘irrationally’ willing to contribute to the public account,
1The economic literature on voluntarily provided public goods, largely related to Olson’s
(1965) classical analysis of collective action, has been pioneered by the fundamental work by
Bergstrom et al. (1986).
2The pioneering experiments have been run in the ‘70s and ‘80s, thanks to Marwell, Dawes,
Orbell and Isaac and Walker (for an extensive survey, see Ledyard, 1995).
1others act as free riders. The major goal of our model is to provide a satisfactory
evolutionary account for such heterogeneity in the PGG, by predicting neither
universal free riding nor full cooperation. We aim at providing an answer to the
following question: does evolutionary dynamics lead to a stable coexistence of
‘nice’ and ‘mean’ guys in the PGG? Can we ﬁnd polymorphic equilibria where
free riders and (diﬀerent types of) cooperators coexist, in the medium-long run?
Our paper shows, to our knowledge for the ﬁrst time, that within a PGG frame-
work with three players simultaneously involved, stable coexistence between free
riders and various types of (conditional and unconditional) cooperators is pos-
sible, in line with experimental evidence. Further, with regard to populations
where a positive proportion of so called ‘strong reciprocators’ is initially present,
coexistence interestingly occurs in correspondence with cost to impact ratios (of
punishment) which are neither too high nor too low, as it is the case in the lab-
oratory. By contrast, we ﬁnd that when either the costs of punishing or the
costs of being punished (or both) are very large, only equilibria with monomor-
phic populations are possible. These ﬁndings allow us to evolutionarily ‘map’
recent experimental results on the PGG with price-varying designs (Anderson
and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007), as the diﬀusion of strong reciprocity
and the aggregate level of cooperation turn out to crucially depend on both the
‘price’ and the impact of sanctioning. The structure of the remainder of the
paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the structure of the model and Section 3
illustrates the social dynamics. Section 4 contains our major results and Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
We shall analyse the following context. Let us consider a (very large) community
of individuals enjoying the beneﬁts of a given collective (i.e. non-rival and non-
excludable) good. The interdependence among individuals manifests itself on
the occasion of random encounters: in other words, we are introducing a game
with a random matching structure. However, a key assumption is that randomly
occurring encounters involve three players at a time: when three individuals are
matched, their behaviour crucially aﬀects the possibility to actually provide the
collective good, as well as each other’s enjoyment of the good. This reﬂects the
structure of PGGs, where a group of N players (with N>2) is involved. A key
feature of our model is that while the objective, material game takes the form
of the PGG, players do subjectively behave as their ‘type’ prescribes to do. The
structure of the material PGG will be introduced in this section, whereas the
diﬀerent player types composing the heterogeneous populations under study
will be illustrated in Section 3. In each three-player matching, the ‘material
game’ to be played is the well-known PGG. More speciﬁcally, we assume that
a single player has to make a binary, ‘all-or-nothing’ choice: he may either
contribute to the public good (by giving a certain amount of money) or free ride3.
3Hence, the present structure diﬀers from a continuous contribution setting, where players
are free to contribute by any desired amount of their endowments. Further, it it is worth
2Hence, material consequences for the players depend on their choosing between
contribute (or ‘cooperate’) and free ride (or ‘defect’) only. Since each agent has
to decide whether to cooperate (C) or defect (D), each matching among three
individuals will produce one of the following six outcomes: (DDD), (DDC),
(DCC), (CDD), (CDC), (CCC). As far as the material consequences of each
matching are concerned, universal cooperation (CCC) Pareto-dominates mutual
defection (DDD). Further, we assume that the public good to be provided is a
threshold public good. The key feature of threshold public good games (Cadsby
and Maynes, 1999) is the following: if a suﬃciently large proportion of agents do
contribute to the public good, so that the stated level of contributions is reached,
the good is provided; otherwise, agents lose their contributions and the good is
not provided4. In our model, we suppose that if N coop is the number of players
cooperating in each matching, N coop = 2 is the ‘critical threshold’ of cooperators
to be achieved for the public good to be privately provided. Unilateral free
riding (that is, DCC), by exploiting the non-excludability of the good and the
two opponents’ cooperation, is then the most individually rewarding outcome,
in material terms. By contrast, unilateral cooperation (that is, CDD) is the
worst material outcome, for a single player (as she is unilaterally incurring costs
for a public good that will not be provided). Hence, from the point of view of
each individual player, the above six possible combinations of choices lead to
the material consequences captured by the following payoﬀ matrix:
DD DC CC
D a a b
C c d e
(1)
Table 1 3-player PGG matrix
where c < a < d ≤ e < b5, C = Cooperate and D = Defect.
The above matrix has to be read as follows: the ﬁrst row contains the mate-
rial consequences for the row player when he plays D and the opponents both
play D (ﬁrst column); when he plays D, one opponent plays D and the third
observing that also most threshold public goods experiments assume that players can either
decide not to contribute or to contribute by a given amount.
4As Myatt and Wallace (2008) correctly observe, it is the case that, beyond economics,
threshold games are central to a large and signiﬁcant sociological literature including works on
crowd behaviour, the onset of riots and strikes and other social movements. For an evolution-
ary analysis of collective action focusing on the shape of public-good production functions,
see Myatt and Wallace (2009).
5By assuming that e may be greater than d, we allow for the possibility that the threshold
public good under study also possesses the following feature. Once a speciﬁc provision-point
(the ‘threshold’) is met (Isaac et al., 1989), the amount of the public good may further increase,
provided that the aggregate level of contributions increases. This is equivalent to assuming
that contributions beyond the threshold levels, far from being wasted, result in further beneﬁts
to the group. In our model, this would imply that the individual payoﬀ from playing C when
the other two players also cooperate (that is, e) is greater than the individual payoﬀ from
playing C when one of the two opponents only cooperates, while the other defects (that is,
d).
3player plays C (second column); when he plays D and both opponents play C
(third column), respectively. The second row has to be read analogously6.
3 Social Dynamics
We analyse social dynamics by means of a (direct) evolutionary game-theoretical
approach7. In line with the well-known ‘indirect evolutionary approach’ (IEA;
see on this G¨ uth and Yaari, 1992), we also suppose that what drives social evo-
lution are material payoﬀs only8. More speciﬁcally, as we better clarify below
in this section, we assume that players imitate the individuals who achieve the
best performances, in purely material terms. As Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001)
observe: “the evolutionary approach has been often used in economics to jus-
tify the assumption of material payoﬀ maximization (...). However, it turns out
that this line of argument is not true without some non-trivial qualiﬁcations,
for it is possible that non-individualistic preferences are materially more re-
warding than individualistic preferences in certain strategic environments” (pp.
232-233). However, a key diﬀerence between the IEA and our model is the fol-
lowing. In the standard structure of the IEA players act as utility maximisers.
By contrast, we decided not to introduce players’ subjective utilities, as, within
an evolutionary framework, individuals can plausibly be characterised as bound-
edly rational players, crucially aﬀected by social forces (rather by a ‘calculating
rationality’) rewarding those who turn out to be the ﬁttest within the popu-
lation under study. In this light, we prefer to refer to ‘non-utility-maximising
types’, rather than to rational agents lucidly attempting to maximise a given
structure of preferences. In other words, we stick to the traditional evolutionary
methodology, in which individual players are supposed to play ‘hardwired’ pro-
grammed strategies over their lifetimes. Therefore, player types will be directly
deﬁned in behavioural terms, rather than by referring to an underlying structure
of (more or less sophisticated) preferences. In our model, player types prescribe
the behavioural patterns which bring about speciﬁc material consequences; in
turn, such material consequences drive social evolution, in the sense that the be-
havioural patterns that turn out to be more rewarding – in material terms – are
imitated at the expense of less rewarding ones. However, in the light of real-life
and experimental evidence on the coexistence of selﬁsh and non-selﬁsh agents
within several strategically signiﬁcant social contexts, we also assume that a
certain degree of heterogeneity initially exists, as to the content of such ﬁxed,
‘wired-in’ strategies. As Camerer and Fehr (2006) maintain: “heterogeneity in
other-regarding preferences and bounded rationality, along with the structure of
6Such payoﬀs may be seen as the natural extension of a material PD, when three players
(rather than two) are simultaneously involved.
7For a recent, interesting evolutionary analysis of a collective action problem, with a partic-
ular focus on threshold games in which players face a ‘teamwork dilemma’ (that is a strategic
situation where the critical threshold is greater than one, like in our model), see Myatt and
Wallace (2008).
8The IEA is ‘indirect’, as a view of social evolution, as what compete one with the other
are ‘cultural traits’ (rather than genetic ones).
4social interactions, determine when collective outcomes are close to predictions
based on rationality and self-regarding preferences, or are far from those pre-
dictions (...) The new models of heterogeneous social preferences and bounded
rationality explain these puzzling results in a unifying way because they ex-
plicitly take heterogeneity and incentive interactions between diﬀerent types of
individuals into account. Therefore, they can explain when Economic Man dom-
inates aggregate outcomes and when he fails to do so” (p. 52). With speciﬁc
reference to a motivational force such as reciprocity, Fehr and G¨ achter (1999),
by focusing on sixteen diﬀerent experimental studies, interestingly show that
reciprocally and selﬁshly motivated people turn out to systematically coexist:
in all scenarios both types are present in non-negligible proportions, though the
former seems to prevail. In a similar vein, several recent papers indicate that the
existence of distinct types of players emerges experimentally (see e.g. Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2005 and Kocher et al., 2008). Fischbacher and G¨ achter (2006), by
means of a new methodological strategy, both account for the existence of types
in the lab and, through a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary
cooperation, show that the interaction of heterogeneous types plays a key role
in accounting for the dynamics of cooperation9. In the light of this, we claim
that a sensible modelling choice is to restrict the strategy space to ‘focal’ types
only and, more speciﬁcally, to the few behavioural patterns whose quantitative
signiﬁcance in relevant strategic interaction settings is ‘revealed’ and increas-
ingly conﬁrmed by carefully controlled economic experiments. In particular, as
far as experimental games on sociality are concerned, available lab evidence in-
dicates that the issue of heterogeneity ought to be taken seriously and that (a)
a signiﬁcant proportion of subjects are self-interested and (b) a sizeable propor-
tion act cooperatively (e.g. play C in the PD or make positive contributions in
PGGs or in Dictator Games). However, as far as the latter, broad category is
concerned (i.e. ‘cooperative’ players), experiments indicate that diﬀerent forms
of pro-sociality seems to be at work, within the strategic contexts investigated
so far. The major goal of our model is to shed light on the evolutionary fate
of heterogeneous populations where selﬁsh and non-selﬁsh players are initially
present, by focusing on both the possibility to actually provide the public good
and the (associated) equilibrium population mixture of player types.
3.1 Four Behavioural Types: Egoists, Strong Reciproca-
tors, Reciprocators and Altruists
Although previous research clearly indicates that many people act as if they
were driven by social preferences, not everybody does. In fact, most experimen-
tal studies show that a substantial number of subjects behave in a standard,
purely selﬁsh manner. A key question, therefore, is how the “heterogeneity of
motives at the individual level can be captured by parsimonious models and
how the diﬀerent individual motivations interact” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005,
p.155). The two authors also point out that available empirical evidence reveals
9For a similar methodological strategy, see Kurzban and Houser (2005).
5that the four quantitatively most important types of social preferences that have
been established so far are strong reciprocity, inequity aversion, unconditional
altruism and spitefulness (or envy). In the present model, we rule out distribu-
tional social preferences such as inequity aversion10 and spitefulness11 and focus
instead on strong reciprocity and unconditional altruism. More speciﬁcally, in
line with Antoci and Zarri (2008), we explicitly draw a distinction between (sim-
ple) reciprocators and strong reciprocators and separately investigate all three
pro-social types of players (namely, altruists, reciprocators and strong recipro-
cators) within 2-type populations where public good provision privately occurs
and opportunistic players who ride free on others’ generosity are also (initially)
present.
3.1.1 Egoists
In all the three 2-type populations we explore in this paper, we assume that
a positive proportion of the initial population is composed by classic selﬁsh
players. With reference to our 3-player PGG, we deﬁne a Selﬁsh player (SEL;
or ‘Egoist’), as an individual who always plays D (i.e. he never contributes to
the public good to be privately provided).
3.1.2 Altruists
In the 3-player PGG under study, an Altruistic player (ALT) is a player who al-
ways plays C (i.e. she always contributes to the public good to be provided). In
other words, ALTs are unconditional cooperators who systematically contribute
to the public account, regardless of what their opponents do, in each matching.
3.1.3 Reciprocators
A reciprocator (REC) here closely resembles Gintis’ (2000) Homo reciprocans,
who “comes to strategic interaction with a propensity to cooperate, responds to
cooperative behavior by maintaining or increasing his level of cooperation, and
responds to noncooperative behavior by retaliating against the ‘oﬀenders’, even
at a cost to himself, and even when he could not reasonably expect future per-
sonal gains to ﬂow from such retaliation” (pp. 251-252). Hence a REC, unlike
an ALT or a SEL, has no dominant strategies but is willing to act as a condi-
tional cooperator, by displaying, according to his opponent’s type, both positive
and negative reciprocity (see on this Rabin, 1993). Reciprocators can be seen
as players driven by a hardwired norm of conditional cooperation leading them
to prefer the joint cooperation outcome to outcomes in which the partners get
10According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2005), available experimental evidence indicates that
strong reciprocity is quantitatively more important than inequity aversion.
11Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) note that spiteful choices seem to be quantitatively less
important than reciprocal choices, at experimental level. Further, spitefulness cannot account
for the stylised fact that the same people are often ready to help others by bearing personal
costs in some contexts, but are also willing to harm others in other contexts (p. 155).
6exploited – while SELs act as if they were driven by the opposite preference or-
dering over these two types of outcomes12. As far as lab evidence on conditional
cooperation is concerned, it is interesting to notice that in Brosig’s (2002) ex-
perimental one-shot PD most subjects did not exploit their partners when they
expected them to play cooperatively, even under conditions of anonymity. As
he notes: “when subjects believed that their partner would cooperate, they hes-
itated to maximize their own payoﬀ through defection” (p. 284). Analogously,
Gintis (2000) observes that experimental subjects often report retrospectively
that they were conditional cooperators, in the game protocol. Guttman (2003)
develops a theory in which ‘reciprocator types’ survive in a competitive, evo-
lutionary environment where they have to compete with ‘opportunistic types’
who act by maximising material payoﬀs and, as a consequence, prefer to exploit
their opponents over jointly cooperating. However, in his model, where players
are randomly matched and play a PD game (rather than a PGG), reciprocators
and opportunists are deﬁned not by their strategies, but by their preferences
and, as a consequence, he analyses social dynamics by adopting the IEA, while
(as we clariﬁed above) we deﬁne our player types directly in behavioural terms
and adopt a classic direct evolutionary approach13.
3.1.4 Strong Reciprocators
As we clariﬁed above, a key feature of reciprocity is the propensity to respond
to defection by defecting. However, as Gintis (2000) interestingly points out,
when other forms of punishment of ‘unfair’ opponents are available, Homo re-
ciprocans is often willing to use them. In other words, it is very likely that
if institutional features allow it, a conditional cooperator will behave in such
a context as a Strong Reciprocator (SR), that is as a conditional cooperator
who both responds to defection (cooperation) with defection (cooperation) and
incurs costs in order to explicitly punish defectors. For example, this occurs in
Ostrom et al. (1992). A signiﬁcant level of punishment has been found also
by Fehr and G¨ achter (2000): in that well-known study, unlike in Ostrom et
al. (1992), the design included the possibility of explicit retaliation but ruled
out strategic behaviour, since the two authors ensured that group composition
changed in every period, so that subjects were aware that punishers could not
beneﬁt from costly retaliation. The main reason why we decided to also explore
a 2-type population where SELs interact with SRs is that experiments suggest
12In this regard, Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) observe: “Economists and biologists deﬁned
the term ‘reciprocity’ in the past in diﬀerent ways. Biologists think of reciprocity, or ‘reciprocal
altruism’, as tit-for-tat strategies in repeated interactions (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton
1981). Some economists (Binmore 1998) use the term in a similar way. During the last ten
years, however, an increasing number of contributions have shown that reciprocal behavior also
exists in sequentially structured one-shot interactions. Reciprocity in one-shot interactions
cannot be explained on the basis of selﬁsh motives” (p. 184).
13A further important diﬀerence between the two papers is that while, as we clarify below
in this section, we suppose that the time horizon is inﬁnite, Guttman (2003) combines the
IEA with a ﬁnitely repeated game: within such evolutionary environment, he ﬁnds that both
the reciprocator and the opportunist type will optimally cooperate over most of the stages of
their careers.
7that the presence of explicit, targeted punishment opportunities crucially aﬀects
the ﬁnal aggregate outcomes (see Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000 and Ones and Putter-
man, 2007). In other words, we do this in the light of the fact that experimental
research clearly indicates that the ﬁnal outcome of a given game is extremely
sensitive to the speciﬁc features of the punishment options available to the play-
ers (Masclet et al., 2003; Anderson and Putterman, 2006). Speciﬁcally, as far
as punishment is concerned, the two diﬀerent treatments of the PGG analysed
in Fehr and G¨ achter (2000) make clear that the overall levels of cooperation
in the population seem to critically depend on the possibility or not, for the
subjects, to have access to direct targeted punishment, rather than to implicit
punishment (in the form of low contributions to the public good to be provided)
only14. In this light, in the 3-player PGG under study, a SR is both willing to
(conditionally) cooperate and incurs costs in order to punish defectors: hence,
we assume that the propensity to incur costs in order to explicitly punish de-
fectors is what diﬀerentiates SRs from RECs15. Real-life cases of nonstrategic
punishment occur when participants in bloody family feuds seek revenge even
when it is extremely costly to do so and when people decide to walk away from
proﬁtable transactions whose terms they believe to be unfair (see on this Frank,
1987).
3.2 Information Assumptions and Replicator Dynamics
However, a key point is that information assumptions play a crucial role, for
both reciprocators and strong reciprocators. In this light, we investigate strong
reciprocators’ behaviour by separately assuming ex ante recognition and ex post
recognition of the opponent’s type. As we will see in Section 4, this will allow
us to consider three types of SRs, that is brave, consequentialist and vengeful
SRs. As far as RECs are concerned, we suppose that the opponent’s type can be
recognised ex ante, so that we separately focus on consequentialist and vengeful
RECs only. We further suppose that time is continuous and the population is
modelled as a continuum of players. As anticipated above, a random matching
structure exists, so that 3-player interactions continuously occur over time. As
far as such 3-player matchings are concerned, the material game that individuals
play is the PGG illustrated in Section 216. On the whole, we (separately) focus
on three 2-type populations of boundedly rational players. Hence, x and (1−x)
indicate the proportions of individuals of the types SEL and SR; SEL and REC
and SEL and ALT, respectively. Following Taylor and Jonker (1978), we suppose
that the growth rates of the proportions are given by the well-known replicator
14Fehr and G¨ achter (2002) interestingly ﬁnd that a clear relationship exists between con-
tributing and punishing: in their PGG experiment, 75% of the punishment acts carried out
by the 240 subjects have been executed by above-average contributors.
15The analysis of this case is important, since, as Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) maintain:
“empirical evidence clearly suggests that in the domain of payoﬀ-decreasing or punishing
behavior, strong negative reciprocity is the dominant motive” (p. 155).
16Miller and Andreoni’s (1991) work is the ﬁrst theoretical paper aimed at providing exper-
imental evidence on the PGG with evolutionary foundations.
8equations17:
·
x = x(1 − x)[EΠSEL(x) − EΠi(x)]
where EΠSEL are the expected payoﬀs of type SEL and EΠi are the expected
payoﬀs of type i = SR, REC, ALT. Expected payoﬀs are calculated by using
conditional probabilities, as we will see below.
Replicator dynamics are a widely adopted model of social (as well as nat-
ural) selection dynamics characterised by payoﬀ monotonicity, where the most
rewarding strategies survive and spread over at the expense of less rewarding
ones (see on this also Weibull, 1995).
4 Results
In this section, we present our major results, with regard to the three 2-type
populations we focus on, namely SEL-SR (Case 1), SEL-REC (Case 2) and SEL-
ALT (Case 3). However, before separately considering these cases, a preliminary
clariﬁcation is in order. In both Case 1 and Case 2, a positive proportion of
conditional cooperators exists, in the initial population, and whenever three
(either strong or simple) reciprocators meet, both CCC and DDD may arise, as
an equilibrium. With regard to such homogeneous matchings, we suppose, in
line with other works (see e.g. Guttman, 2003 and Antoci and Zarri, 2008), that
when three (either strong or simple) reciprocators meet, a social norm prescribes
that the Pareto-superior (that is, CCC) outcome will prevail.
4.1 Case 1. SEL-SR Population
Let us ﬁrst investigate a mixed population initially composed of Egoists (SELs),
who systematically defect, and Strong Reciprocators (SRs), who are both will-
ing to conditionally cooperate and ready to costly punish ‘mean’ guys, that
is unconditional defectors18. Here we consider three subcases, where diﬀerent
information and behavioural assumptions regarding SRs are separately intro-
duced. As Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) correctly point out, the answer to
the question concerning how the (expected) material payoﬀs of the individualis-
tic and non-individualistic agents compare in equilibrium at various population
compositions crucially depends, inter alia, on the extent of information agents
have on their opponent’s type.
17However, the results of the paper remain the same under any other payoﬀ-monotonic
adoption dynamics (see Weibull 1995).
18Also Sethi and Somanathan (2005) focus on this 2-type population, in their evolutionary
analysis of common property resource use.
94.1.1 Subcase 1.1. Ex Post Recognition and Brave Strong Recipro-
cators
In this ﬁrst subcase, we suppose that SRs do not recognise their opponents’ type
ex ante, so that they bravely play C in each matching (as ALTs do)19. However,
we also assume that, after cooperating, they can recognise their opponents’ type
(ex post recognition assumption) and that if SRs see that their opponent is a
SEL, they are willing to incur material costs in order to punish her. More
speciﬁcally, we believe it is plausible to assume also that the extent of costs for
both punishers and punishees critically depends on the number of SELs and
SRs involved in the 3-player matching: when a single SR meets two SELs, the
costs are given by λ > 0 (for the punisher) and ε > 0 (for the punishees),
respectively, whereas when two SRs meet a SEL, the costs are given by π > 0
and η > 0, respectively. As a consequence, depending on the number of SELs
and SRs being present in a single 3-player matching, at the individual level the
PGG will lead to one of the (material) outcomes captured by the matrix below:
SEL,SEL SEL,SR SR,SR
SEL a a − ε b − η
SR c − λ d − π e
(2)
Table 2. Material Payoﬀs in a SEL-SR population (Subcase 1.1)
In this subcase, expected payoﬀs are:
EΠSEL(x)=ax2 +( a − ε)x(1 − x) + (b − η)(1 − x)2
EΠSR(x) = (c − λ)x2 +( d − π)x(1 − x)+e(1 − x)2
and replicator dynamics can be written as follows:
˙ x = x(1 − x)
!




α(ε) :=b − e + d − c − ε = α − ε, α > 0
β(ε,λ) :=a − d + 2(e − b)+λ +3 ε = β + λ +3 ε, β < 0
γ(ε) :=b − e − 2ε = γ − 2ε, γ > 0
Moreover, let us deﬁne ∆(ε,λ) := (β(ε,λ))2 −4α(ε)γ(ε) and λ0 := 2γ +d−a−
2
#
(γ + d − c)γ.
On the basis of simple algebraic calculations, we obtain the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 1 The ﬁxed point x∗ =1always exists and is always attractive.
Further,
19This attitude resembles Sugden’s (1986) notion of ‘brave’ reciprocity.
10i.) if ε <
b − e
2
, ∆(ǫ,λ) < 0, (Region 1 in Figure 1(a)), the dynamic regime
is represented by case 1, in Figure 1(b);
ii.) if ε <
b − e
2
, ∆(ǫ,λ) > 0, (Region 2 in Figure 1(a)), the dynamic regime
is represented by case 2 in Figure 1(b);
iii.) if ε >
b − e
2
, (Region 3 in Figure 1(a)), the dynamic regime is represented
by case 3 in Figure 1(b)




By contrast, if λ0 is negative, the curve ∆(ε,λ) = 0 crosses the ε-axis in ε0 > 0
and the tangency point (that always exists) between the line ε = b−e
2 and this
curve shifts upwards.
4.1.2 Subcase 1.2. Ex Ante Recognition and Consequentialist Strong
Reciprocators
Here we suppose that, unlike in Subcase 1.1., SRs can recognise the opponents’
type ex ante. In this regard, it has been argued that players tend to sub-
consciously signal their type via facial expressions and other emotional factors
(Frank, 1988). Hence, we assume that, when meeting a SEL and another SR,
SRs decide to play C, as in that case (with two cooperating agents) they would
reach the ‘critical threshold’ for the public good to be provided. In other words,
what we are considering here is a variant of Strong Reciprocity in which a conse-
quentialist component plays a key role. Further, like in Subcase 1.1., we suppose
that SELs are explicitly (and costly) punished by SRs (the levels of costs are
the same as in the previous subcase):
SEL,SEL SEL,SR SR,SR
SEL a a − ε b − η
SR a − λ d − π e
(4)
Table 3. Material Payoﬀs in a SEL-SR population (Subcase 1.2)
Let us observe the key diﬀerences, compared to the previous subcase. The
new curve ∆(ε,λ) = 0 now is always above the curve depicted in Figure 1:
it crosses the λ-axis in correspondence with the point λ02 =2 γ + d − a −
2
#
(γ + d − a)γ which is greater than λ0, whereas the tangency point with the
vertical line is the same as before. Further, the content of the previous footnote
does not hold, in this subcase, as λ02 is always positive. In conclusion, the
region with an attractive internal ﬁxed point (Region 2) in Subcase 1.2 is always
larger than the one we found in Subcase 1.1. The subsequent Figures show this.
Clearly, all the parameters are the same.
Proposition 2 In this subcase the dynamic regimes of the system are the same
as the ones of the dynamic regime (3). Further, Region 2 in Figure 1(a), other




























Figure 1: Dynamic regimes in subcase 1.1.
12Proof. Notice simply that the curve ∆(ε,λ) = 0 shifts parallelly upwards.
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(b) Subcase 1.2
Figure 2: Fixed points values, varying the parameter ε. Repulsive (respec-
tively, attractive) ﬁxed points are represented by dotted (respectively, continu-
ous) curves. The parameters’ values are: b = 26, e = 20, d = 20, a = 5, c = 1,
λ =3 .5.
4.1.3 Subcase 1.3. Ex Ante Recognition and Vengeful Strong Re-
ciprocators
Like in Subcase 1.2, also in this third subcase we assume that SRs can recognise
the opponents’ type ex ante. However, we suppose here that such players, far
from reasoning consequentialistically, can be characterised as ‘vengeful’ SRs,
in the sense that they are willing to systematically sanction SELs not only by
means of explicit punishment (like in the previous subcases), but also implicitly,
that is by always defecting in each 3-player matching where at least one selﬁsh
agent is present, regardless of the material consequences that this choice will
bring about. Hence, the material payoﬀ matrix now takes the following form:
13SEL,SEL SEL,SR SR,SR
SEL a a − ε a − η
SR a − λ a − π e
(5)
Table 4. Material Payoﬀs in a SEL-SR population (Subcase 1.3)
Here the dynamics are represented by the equation:
˙ x = x(1 − x)
!




α(ε)1 := −γ1 − ε < 0
β(ε,λ)1 := 2γ1 + λ +3 ε > 0
γ(ε)1 := −γ1 − 2ε < 0
with γ1 := e − a>0.
Proposition 3 For any parameter choice, the dynamic regime here is the one
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Figure 3: Dynamic regime in Subcase 1.3
4.2 Egoists and Strong Reciprocators can Coexist
On the whole, in a SEL-SR population where a 3-player PGG is continuously
played, we found that the attractive ﬁxed points critically depend on both infor-
mation and behavioural assumptions concerning Strongly Reciprocal players. In
particular, coexistence between SRs and SELs cannot occur when ex ante recog-
nition holds and SRs are supposed to act as ‘vengeful’ players who defect when-
ever their 3-player interactions include at least one selﬁsh player (Subcase 1.3).
By contrast, coexistence of Egoists and Strong Reciprocators may be observed
if we suppose that Strong Reciprocators can recognise the opponents’ type ex
post only and act bravely in each matching. Further, a similar conclusion can
be reached even when SRs are supposed to be able to recognise their opponents’
type ex ante (` a la Frank), provided that they are driven by a consequentialist
14attitude: in this scenario, coexistence arises as an equilibrium outcome, insofar
as, in 3-player interactions involving one SR and two SELs, the costs for both
the punisher and the punishees are not too large (see Figure 1(a))20.
4.3 Case 2. SEL-REC Population
Let us now turn to a mixed population initially composed of Egoists (SELs)
and (Simple) Reciprocators (RECs) who, unlike SRs, do not incur costs in or-
der to explicitly punish defectors. In other words, defecting is the only means
of (implicit) punishment of their opponents that RECs have access to. Here
we assume that players can recognise their opponents ex ante. However, analo-
gously to the case of Strong Reciprocators, we separately analyse two subcases
in which these non-selﬁsh players are supposed to act as Consequentialist and
Vengeful RECs, respectively.
4.3.1 Subcase 2.1. Ex Ante Recognition and Consequentialist Re-
ciprocators
SEL,SEL SEL,REC REC,REC
SEL a a b
REC a d e
(7)
Table 5. Material Payoﬀs in a SEL-REC population (Subcase 2.1)
In this subcase, ε = λ = 0. Hence, we are on the origin of the axis of Region
2, where the internal ﬁxed point x∗
1 =
b − e
b − e + d − a
< 1 always exists and
the other internal ﬁxed point coincides with x∗
2 = 1. Therefore, the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 4 For any parameters choice, the dynamic regime is the one il-
lustrated in Figure 4.
4.3.2 Subcase 2.2. Ex Ante Recognition and Vengeful Reciprocators
SEL,SEL SEL,REC REC,REC
SEL a a a
REC a a e
(8)
Table 6. Material Payoﬀs in a SEL-REC population (Subcase 2.2)
20This is in line with a key feature of most experimental games, where (unlike PGGs with
price-varying designs such as Anderson and Putterman, 2006 or Carpenter, 2007) punishment





Figure 4: Dynamic regime in Subcase 2.1.
This subcase can be seen as Subcase 1.3. ‘degenerating’ without internal
ﬁxed points.
Proposition 5 For any parameters choice, the dynamic regime is the one il-





Figure 5: Dynamic regime in Subcase 2.2.
Within a SEL-REC population where a 3-player PGG is continuously played,
a mixture of SELs and RECs arises when SELs initially coexist with Consequen-
tialist RECs. By contrast, insofar as Vengeful RECs interact with SELs, evolu-
tionary dynamics leads to a monomorphic population composed exclusively of
reciprocators.
4.4 Case 3. SEL-ALT Population
Finally, let us focus on a population where only Egoists (SELs), who systemat-
ically defect, and Altruists (ALTs), who systematically cooperate, are present.
SEL,SEL SEL,ALT ALT,ALT
SEL a a b
ALT c d e
(9)
Table 7. Material Payoﬀs in a SEL-ALT population
In such context, the dynamics are:
˙ x = x(1 − x)(αx2 + βx + γ)
16where:
α := d + b − c − e>0
β := −2b +2 e + a − d<0
γ := b − e>0
In suct context, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6 If |β|2 − 4αγ > 0, the dynamic regime is represented in Figure
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Figure 6: Dynamic regimes in Case 3.
5 Concluding Remarks
The growing success obtained in the last decades by behavioral economics cru-
cially depends on its ability to convincingly show, both theoretically and ex-
perimentally, that within several economically interesting contexts, subjects are
often willing to ‘irrationally’ cooperate, reward and punish others even at a
cost and regardless of any expectation of economic beneﬁts. These forms of
costly cooperation, rewarding and sanctioning, which in the laboratory turn
out to be often carried out also in one-shot interactions, in the last period of
ﬁnitely repeated interactions and in perfect stranger treatments (in which no
subject encounters another more than once) can then reasonably be qualiﬁed
as genuinely nonstrategic21 – at least to a signiﬁcant extent –, as they diﬀer
21Neuroeconomic evidence has been increasingly showing that the desire to punish is often
strong and nonstrategic, and that it is a largely automatic response triggered by emotional
17in a fundamental respect from the (usually complicated) punishment strategies
explored in repeated games where self-interested players only are involved (like
the ones studied within the classic Folk Theorem literature). The model pre-
sented in the previous sections provides well-known stylised experimental facts
with evolutionary foundations, with reference to 2-type populations in which
selﬁsh free riders and (diﬀerent types of) unselﬁsh agents are initially present.
Our major result is that, like in Guttman (2003), the equilibrium population,
far from being monomorphic, may turn out to be a stable mixture of selﬁsh
and non-selﬁsh types22. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper where such
mixed composition of the equilibrium population emerges with regard to a PGG
setting. Further, while other theoretical works ﬁnd that reciprocators coexist
with egoists in equilibrium, in our contribution Selﬁsh players may coexist in
the long-run not only with Reciprocators, but also with Strong Reciprocators
and with Altruists (see Case 1 and Case 3 in Section 4, respectively), that is
with unconditional – rather than conditional – cooperators. Moreover, our re-
sults indicate that coexistence of ‘nice’ and ‘mean’ guys in equilibrium may
occur under both ex ante and ex post type recognition: under both informa-
tion assumptions, we found that a mix of Egoists and Strong Reciprocators can
prevail, in the medium-long run. Such coexistence results are in line not only
with a real-life widespread phenomenon such as the simultaneous presence of
‘nice’ and ‘mean’ guys in the same social context, but also with a robust ﬁnd-
ing emerging from experiments dealing with social preferences: the systematic
coexistence, within a given experimental framework, of selﬁsh and non-selﬁsh
behaviours (see on this Fehr and Gaechter, 1999 and the considerations devel-
oped in the Introduction, in this paper). More speciﬁcally, these results appear
to be consistent with laboratory evidence from PGG experiments, where par-
tial cooperation emerges as a robust ﬁnding in PGGs (both in one-shot versions
and in the earlier rounds of repeated PGGs) and behaviourally heterogeneous
players seem to be systematically involved.
Finally, as far as SEL-SR populations are concerned, we found that the
above results critically depend on the costs and impact of punishment. In this
regard, a new but signiﬁcant experimental research area has been developing,
in the last years, within the so called ‘economics of punishment’ literature, with
the aim of investigating the sensitivity of nonstrategic punishment to standard
economic incentives (see Egas and Riedl, 2005; Anderson and Putterman, 2006
and Carpenter, 2007). In particular, by means of price-varying designs of the
PGG, these authors ask whether punishers are unresponsive to the costs of pun-
ishing or whether also nonstrategic sanctions, like ordinary goods, obey the law
forces. At the same time, experiments indicate that such nonstrategic responses are far more
frequent when the punisher perceives the opponent’s type as unfair (see Singer and Fehr,
2005).
22It is important to remark that we are able to reach this conclusion with reference to
a PGG framework where 3-player matchings continuously occur within 2-type populations,
whereas Antoci and Zarri (2008) show that coexistence never occurs with pairwise random
matchings and diﬀerent 3-type populations (such as Altruists, Egoists and various forms of
Strong Reciprocators, that have been separately considered and supposed to initially interact
with the former two player types).
18of demand. The three independently undertaken studies interestingly provide
the same (somewhat paradoxical) answer to such key question: the demand
for nonstrategic punishment displays the usual downward slope with respect to
price23. Hence, both cooperation rates and quantity of punishment in the PGG
critically depend inter alia on the cost parameters. We evolutionarily map this
conclusion as also in our model we may end up with dramatically diﬀerent equi-
librium outcomes (both in terms of cooperation rates and SEL-SR proportions)
depending on the costs to punisher and punished. Further, Anderson and Put-
terman (2006) interestingly ﬁnd that punishment occurs even at higher cost to
the punisher than to the target. This is in line with our evolutionary results:
in our analysis, coexistence of SELs and SRs occurs in correspondence with
relatively low levels of both costs of punishing and costs of being punished.
Whenever either the costs to punisher or the costs of being punished (or both)
are extremely large, coexistence is ruled out, as an equilibrium outcome. How-
ever, as it is evident from Region 2 in Figure 1(a), coexistence of Egoists and
Strongly Reciprocal players in equilibrium is compatible with ratios of costs to
punisher and punished greater than one.
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